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Abstract 
Prior investigations into theory of mind have used strategic games to examine how an opponent’s 
known preferences are used to determine behavior. However, in the social setting, preferences 
are not always known. Mental state information often comes from observing another person’s 
decision and inferring what motivated that decision. This study extended the strategic game 
framework to explore the levels of reasoning used when making these types of inferences. The 
participants were 47 undergraduates at the University of Michigan. Each participant received 
game cards with decisions coming from a “prior player” and was asked if particular choices for 
that player’s missing payoff information could have led to those decisions. The responses to 
these questions indicated whether participants attributed a strategy to the prior player that 
anticipated the next game move (a “predictive” strategy) or did not (a “myopic” strategy). The 
initially assumed strategy was found to be neutral, with predictive inferences becoming more 
common in successive game sets. These results support the role of experience in engaging 
greater depths of reasoning when interpreting another person’s decisions, even in the absence of 
feedback to influence this shift. Additionally, the task of being instructed to interpret another 
person’s decisions may engage in-depth theory of mind reasoning more readily than is naturally 
assumed during an occurring interaction. Further experiments are necessary to determine if and 
how the findings from abstract games correspond to real-world theory of mind use. 
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Using Our Theory of Mind for Inferences in Strategic Reasoning 
Why do we care what other people think? Humans have developed the remarkable 
capacity to have a “theory of mind,” which is the ability to attribute distinct mental states such as 
thoughts, desires, and intentions to another person. This ability is important for social 
interactions because having an accurate representation of the mental states guiding another 
person helps determine what behavior would be appropriate. There are plenty of everyday 
situations that our theory of mind helps us navigate. One example familiar to those in academia 
would be the decision whether or not to apply to a particular graduate school. To make an 
informed decision, the individual would need to estimate how favorably the admissions 
committee would view his/her application in order to determine if applying to that school is 
worth the effort. 
Early signs of the ability to take another person’s perspective seem to emerge during the 
first year of life (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). In infancy, perspective taking is demonstrated by 
implicit expectations. This ability later develops into making explicit verbal predictions about 
another person’s mental states (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). The classic test for having a 
theory of mind assesses whether an individual can explicitly attribute a belief to another person 
that the individual taking the test exclusively knows to be false. Children begin to reliably 
demonstrate this ability at age 4 (Perner et al., 1987). The most advanced theory of mind 
milestone that has been studied is the ability to use higher levels of mental state reasoning, e.g., 
reasoning about what one person believes about a second person’s mental states. This capacity 
seems to emerge between ages 6 and 7 (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). Studies of how these skills are 
acquired provide evidence that they are gradually developed through practice, as opposed to 
sudden insights of understanding (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006). A more recent focus of 
THEORY OF MIND AND INFERENCES 	   4 
research has been to study how these skills mature beyond childhood and how they are typically 
used in adult interactions.  
Although some types of basic perspective taking appear to be automatic (Kovacs, Teglas, 
& Endress, 2010; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Scott, 2010), more advanced 
theory of mind usage more closely resembles a reasoning process that can be spontaneously 
activated in relevant situations (Back & Apperly, 2010; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010). As with 
other human reasoning, there are biases and variability in how we reason about others’ mental 
states (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Converse, Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2008; Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs, 
& Nye, 1996; Nickerson, 1999). Nickerson’s (1999) cognitive model of how we form and update 
models of other people’s minds neatly accounts for some of the biases that are encountered. His 
account sets our own mind as an initial model, with alterations that can be made in one of three 
ways. Knowledge can be subtracted based on information we have reason to believe is held by us 
alone, added based on group associations about the other person, or updated based on 
interactions with the other person. Biases can result from a mistake at any of these steps. The 
most general type of bias is a failure to make the appropriate distinctions between someone 
else’s mind and our own, which is known as an egocentric bias.  
Studies of these biases have provided valuable evidence about how theory of mind 
matures into adulthood. Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar (2004) looked at egocentric biases in 
children and adults, with results indicating that theory of mind in adults is a more practiced and 
efficient version of the skills seen in children. The investigations about a more specific type of 
egocentric bias called a “knowledge bias” give further information about how theory of mind 
develops. Complementary with Nickerson’s (1999) account, this bias occurs when someone fails 
to subtract his/her own unique knowledge about the situation when forming mental state 
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assumptions. Mitchell et al. (1996) surprisingly found some knowledge biases that are more 
prevalent in adults than children, because the integration of different types of mental state 
information changes as we age. Children seem to primarily weight information based on what 
another person has seen, whereas adults’ consideration of visual versus verbal information to the 
other person can be influenced by the observer’s own knowledge. Although this study 
demonstrated limitations due to the complexity of situations, being able to integrate multiple 
sources of mental state information is clearly an advantageous development. 
Although integrating mental state information is already challenging, the next step is 
using this information in interactions. One type of task that has been used to assess how theory of 
mind is demonstrated behaviorally is a competitive two-player game with interactions between 
each player’s strategies (Goodie, Doshi, & Young, 2010; Hedden & Zhang, 2002; Meijering, van 
Rijn, Taatgen, & Verbrugge, 2012). Game theory analysis can then be used to analyze the 
implications of players’ choices. These research projects have typically looked at the process of 
participants choosing their own strategy, which if done optimally, necessarily involves predicting 
the move of an opponent with well-defined motives. Making predictions requires theory of mind; 
one must take the opponent’s perspective in order to predict his/her strategy. These studies have 
shown clear distinctions between optimal strategies and how participants have behaved (Hedden 
& Zhang, 2002; Meijering et al., 2012). The optimal strategy in these games is to use backwards 
induction, by which a player selects the ideal final outcome and then compares prior decision 
points to determine which choices lead to that outcome. However, there is evidence that players 
do not necessarily use this strategy. Meijering et al. (2012) have tracked participants’ eye 
movements and found that players seem to use the sub-optimal strategy of initially looking 
forward through the game scenario, similar to causal reasoning, then checking decisions by using 
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backwards comparisons. Although these studies are limited in their ability to extend to the social 
environment, the use of causal reasoning instead of the optimal game theory solution suggests 
that the approaches taken to solving these games may be a general mechanism used in other 
scenarios. Thus, it remains promising that the findings may extend to how we approach daily 
social interactions. 
Several studies have used what is known as a “Stackelberg game” in the game theory 
literature, which is defined by sequential moves and a finite number of stages (Osborne & 
Rubinstein, 1994). Specifically, these studies have used two-player games with at most three 
stages (Goodie et al., 2010; Hedden & Zhang, 2002; Meijering et al., 2012). The decision at each 
of the three stages is to either end the game and receive the current outcome or continue the 
game to the next stage. The participant has control over the first and third stages, but an 
opponent controls the second stage. This format allows for theory of mind analysis because the 
decision whether or not to continue the game to the next stage depends on what the player 
expects the opponent to decide at that stage. The limitation to three stages allows for distinct 
strategies reflecting different types of reasoning.  
A focus of these analyses has been the levels of theory of mind reasoning that can be 
used. As discussed before, higher levels of reasoning typically become available during 
childhood (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). In these specific games, the participant, Player I, can 
consider that the opponent, Player II, may be anticipating the participant’s strategy at the third 
decision point. As in Hedden and Zhang (2002), a Player II who does indeed anticipate Player I 
can be termed “predictive.” The alternative, a Player II who only compares his/her own 
outcomes without predicting Player I, is known as “myopic.” More complicated options 
therefore exist in Player I’s perspective of the game. A Player I who assumes a predictive Player 
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II is using second-order reasoning. A Player I who assumes a myopic Player II is using first-
order reasoning. Although not found in these studies, Player I could also be myopic and not 
consider Player II at all. Hedden and Zhang (2002) found that first-order theory of mind 
reasoning, the less complex option, is most prevalent initially. However, second-order reasoning 
becomes increasingly more common throughout experience with a Player II who does indeed act 
predictively. This experiment was conducted using mixed-motive games, in which the players’ 
payoff structures vary independently of each other. Another option is to study strictly 
competitive games, in which one player’s loss corresponds to the other player’s gain. Goodie et 
al. (2010) found that when using strictly competitive games rather than mixed-motive games, 
second-order reasoning, which is more complex, becomes the default. These mixed results 
indicate that these games contain a wealth of information to be processed and the resulting 
reasoning may reflect the difficulty of integrating information in each type of game. 
Zhang et al. (2012) investigated this idea by attempting to dissociate information 
processing constraints from theory of mind reasoning limitations in the game. They found that 
even when participants were given the same amount of information, assigning them a different 
perspective influenced the likelihood of adopting the predictive game strategy. This finding 
provides evidence that advanced theory of mind reasoning requires cognitive resources beyond 
those solely used to process information. However, it does not rule out the possibility that 
decreasing executive demands may open up resources to be used for more complex perspective 
taking. Different types of tasks with different demands may provide tradeoffs in their 
conduciveness to theory of mind depth. Flobbe, Verbrugge, Hendriks, & Krämer (2008) found 
support that, in children, theory of mind development varies between linguistic and strategic 
tasks. Therefore, a different task such as explicitly asking individuals to reason about an 
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opponent’s decision may lead to different levels of perspective-taking and motivates the present 
investigation. 
The aim of this project is to use the strategic game framework to delve further into mental 
state reasoning. Previous literature has analyzed how known preferences were used to determine 
behavior. Less has been studied about the reverse process: inferring preferences from observed 
behavior. Much of our information about other people comes from observing their actions and 
decisions; less often is an interaction completely specified or preferences explicitly known. It is 
up to the observer to infer what motivations underlie the given decisions. Since assumptions 
about motivation provide valuable mental state information that influences our daily interactions, 
they are worth questioning. How do we make those inferences? The answers are likely more 
complex given the full context of an interaction involving comparable preferences, so this project 
started with the simplified game model to provide a starting point for addressing the more 
complicated, real-world picture.  
In particular, the current project addresses two key questions: what level of reasoning we 
attribute to another person and how that level of reasoning changes with experience. To answer 
these questions, this project examined the scenario of providing participants with decisions 
supposedly from previously played games, but not providing all of the relevant payoff values. To 
study how motivations were inferred, we analyzed whether participants would endorse particular 
values as plausibly leading to that decision. The investigation into the level of reasoning was 
exploratory, since there was not enough evidence to inform how participants would react to this 
new task. However, we suspected that not all participants would reason predictively initially and 
hypothesized that participants would show increasing use of predictive reasoning as they gained 
experience with the task. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 47 undergraduate students (17% males, 83% females) at the University 
of Michigan, who were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool and received 
class credit for their participation. All participants gave informed consent before starting the 
experiment and were debriefed about the origin of the provided “Player II” decisions at the 
conclusion. 
Design 
Game design. The games in this experiment are two-player games that follow the same 
format as those used in Hedden and Zhang (2002). The four possible outcomes are the four cells 
“A,” “B,” “C,” and “D.” These cells each contain respective payoff values for Player I and 
Player II. Each player’s goal is to get his/her highest possible value, which are independently 
ranked from “1” as the worst outcome to “4” as the best. The game starts in cell A and ends 
either at cell D or when a player chooses to “Stop.” When the game ends, each player gets 
his/her respective payoff value from the ending cell. Players have opportunities to make 
decisions in three sequential stages. At these stages, the player in control can choose to either 
“Stop” and end the game in the current cell or “Go” to the next cell. Player I has control over the 
first and third stages; Player II has control over the second stage. A diagram of a sample game 
and the decision points are shown in Figure 1. 
Training games. The 12 games in the training session were chosen to be trivial, 
assigning Player II’s values so that there is one clear decision that satisfies both myopic and 
predictive reasoning, regardless of what Player I decides at the third stage. The two situations 
that precipitate a “Go” decision are strictly ascending Player II values (1-2-3-4) or a “1” in cell B 
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(e.g., 3-1-4-2). In these cases, both the cell C and cell D values are better outcomes than the cell 
B value, so a decision to move is always optimal. The two situations that precipitate a “Stop” 
decision are strictly descending Player II values (4-3-2-1) or a “4” in cell B (e.g., 2-4-1-3). 
Conversely, in both of these cases, Player II is guaranteed a better outcome at cell B than at 
either cell C or cell D, so stopping is always optimal. Player I’s values were chosen in 
conjunction with these strategies to provide equal numbers of games ending in each of the 
possible cells if players choose the optimal strategies. Information about the training games is 
shown in Table 1. 
Experimental games. Several design concerns were used to determine the following 
components for the 48 experimental games. 
Player I values. Player I’s payoff sets were chosen from the 2 x 6 orderings of {1, 2, 3, 
4} that start with either a 1 or a 2. These lower start values were selected to provide plausibility 
that Player I had moved at the first stage and thus Player II was able to complete a turn.  
Player II values. In the experimental games, two of Player II’s potential payoff values 
were missing. Since the game action in cell A is only influenced by Player I’s decision, this 
value is not relevant for interpreting Player II’s decision in the game. Therefore, in all cases, the 
cell A value was missing so that there could be two missing values but only one critical cell for 
analysis. Cell D was not chosen as a critical cell because it may bias participants towards 
predictive reasoning, since looking ahead to cell D is the mark of a predictive player. The critical 
cells were chosen to be cell B and cell C because these cells provide crucial information for 
either a predictive or myopic Player II. The two types of games that had either the cell B value 
missing or the cell C value missing are considered the “B-Missing” type and “C-Missing” type 
for the analyses. The sets of provided values were chosen to be {2, 4} or {1, 3}, with the missing 
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values assumed to complete the set of {1, 2, 3, 4}. There were four patterns containing each 
value set for each game type.  
Diagnostic and non-diagnostic games. Player I’s values determined whether each game 
was “diagnostic,” meaning that different levels of theory of mind reasoning can be determined 
from the participants’ responses. The games in which Player I’s cell D value is greater than the 
cell C value are diagnostic because in these games, Player I would presumably decide to move at 
the third stage. A predictive Player II would anticipate this move, but a myopic player would not, 
so the difference between these two strategies is observable. The remaining games, in which 
Player I has a greater value in cell C than cell D, are “non-diagnostic.” In these games, Player I 
would presumably not move at the third stage; therefore, predictively anticipating this decision 
leads to the same Player II decision as myopically comparing the cell B and cell C values. Non-
diagnostic games were used to balance expected responses and to ensure the participants’ 
understanding of the game. 
Decisions. Although the diagnostic games provide a framework for observing the 
different strategies, Player II’s values also contribute to whether this difference will be observed. 
Within the diagnostic games, each of Player II’s payoff patterns has a trivial missing value and a 
discriminating missing value. Substituting the trivial value into the critical cell provides similar 
patterns to those used for the training games, for which the optimal decision does not depend on 
Player I’s third stage decision. The “prior Player II” decisions written on the experimental cards 
were chosen to correspond to this optimal decision in order to be plausible for either strategy. On 
the other hand, substituting the discriminating missing value into the critical cell leads to a 
different decision for a myopic Player II than for a predictive one. The experimental questions 
were therefore only concerned with the discriminating values. Although the pattern of expected 
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responses differed by strategy, for both strategies there were equal numbers of games where 
substituting the discriminating value would have led to the given decision and games where it 
would have led to the opposite decision. 
Game categories. Within the 48 experimental games, there were 8 different game 
categories: a diagnostic and a non-diagnostic group for each of the 4 patterns of Player II values. 
The games were presented to the participants in 3 sets of 16 to allow the participant sufficient 
time to process each game card and question. Each set consisted of 2 games from each of the 8 
different categories. The game order was pre-determined using random selection among and 
within these categories. Participants received these games in a fixed order that appeared entirely 
random.  
A complete description of the experimental games is shown in Table 2. 
Materials 
The experimental materials consisted of 60 game cards. The cards had borders of 
different colors to distinguish the training games, the B-Missing games, and the C-Missing 
games. Each game card was a square containing the 4 cells, A-D. Each cell listed two values in 
different fonts to distinguish the respective payoff values for Player I and Player II. Twelve of 
these game cards were used in a training session played with the experimenter to gain familiarity 
with the game format. The remaining 48 were used as testing materials. The 12 training cards 
contained full information about each player’s payoff values. The 48 experimental cards, on the 
other hand, had black tape covering two of Player II’s possible outcomes. In addition, a decision 
attributed to a prior Player II was written on the front of these experimental cards. The 
participant was given a question sheet accompanying the experimental cards that asked one 
question per game card.  
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Procedure 
Training session. To begin the training session, the experimenter instructed the 
participant on the rules of the game. Following these instructions were a series of games in 
which the participant played as Player I and the experimenter played as Player II. The training 
games were played interactively by using a coin to track the progression of the game as 
determined by each player’s decisions. Once an endpoint was reached, the experimenter 
acknowledged the end of the game and recorded each player’s point values on a whiteboard. No 
feedback about particular strategies was given except if the participant failed to move on the first 
training game. The first game contained a 1 in cell A, so ending the game at that point was the 
worst possible outcome for the participant. In these cases, the experimenter would question the 
decision in order to check understanding about the goal and/or rules. Additionally, the 
experimenter would provide answers if the participants had further questions. 
Experimental session. In the experimental session, the participant was given a set of 
game cards and told that the decisions written on the cards were made by prior participants who 
played as Player II at the second stage in these games. These decisions were supposedly made 
under full information, but some values had been covered by tape for the purpose of this new 
experiment. The participants were then given an accompanying sheet of questions. For these 
questions, they were asked to circle yes or no to their belief about whether a particular value 
could be in that game’s critical cell, based on Player II’s decision. After giving the instructions, 
the experimenter remained in a divided section of the room and the participant was told to 
contact the experimenter upon finishing a set in order to receive the next one. Once the 
participant had completed all three sets, he/she was asked to fill out an exit questionnaire to 
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provide further information about his/her reasoning in the games. When the questionnaire was 
completed, the participant was thanked and debriefed. 
Scoring 
Predictive scores. As mentioned in the design, for the diagnostic games, the value in the 
corresponding question would lead to a different decision by a myopic Player II than for a 
predictive one. Thus, the participant’s theory of mind level can be discerned by their answer to 
the plausibility of that value. A theory of mind reasoning score was calculated within each set by 
taking the proportion of diagnostic games answered in agreement with the expected predictive 
response. Answers opposite from this response can be assumed to be myopic, since that is the 
logical alternative. Scores were calculated separating the B-Missing type and the C-Missing type 
of games. Each set contained four diagnostic games of each type, so these scores ranged from 0 
to 1 in increments of 0.25. 
Accuracy scores. Since the myopic and predictive strategies yielded the same response 
for the non-diagnostic games, there was no logical alternative to the expected answer in these 
cases. Therefore, responses on these questions were simply scored as “Correct” if the response 
agreed with the joint predictive/myopic response or “Incorrect” if the response disagreed. 
Accuracy was calculated as each individual’s percentage of correct responses for all 24 non-
diagnostic games in the experiment. 
Results 
Data Inclusion 
Among the 47 participants, the decision to remove specific cases was at the discretion of 
the researcher. Eight of the 47 cases (17%) had a positive response to the item on the exit 
questionnaire regarding any suspicions that the decisions on the cards did not come from prior 
THEORY OF MIND AND INFERENCES 	   15 
participants. The most common reason for suspecting planned decisions was the valid doubt that 
a psychology study would provide uncontrolled materials. Although these cases were considered 
for removal, they were ultimately kept because all participants’ exit questionnaire responses 
described dynamic reasoning with a focus on the opponent’s intentions. 
Evidence about participants’ understanding of the task was taken from the performance 
on the non-diagnostic games. The distribution of accuracy scores used to determine outliers is 
shown in Figure 2. Five cases that were outliers on the accuracy distribution were removed due 
to questionable understanding of the task. This left a total of 42 cases for the remaining analyses. 
Overall understanding seemed generally strong among the remaining cases, with an average of 
92% correct responding. 
Predictive Scores by Game Type 
The percentage of participants with each predictive score, the average predictive scores, 
and their standard errors are shown for the three sets within the B-Missing type (see Figure 3) 
and the C-Missing type (see Figure 4). Scores of 0.75 or 1 indicate clear use of the predictive 
strategy. For both types, the distribution charts indicate a greater proportion of respondents using 
the predictive strategy in each successive set. Additionally, for both types, the average predictive 
score increases by set. These results provide preliminary support that the level of reasoning 
shows an increasing trend among game sets.  
In order to investigate whether participants were responding similarly for the two 
different game types, individuals’ overall predictive scores were calculated for each type as the 
average of the three set scores. These values were plotted as seen in Figure 5. A linear model was 
fit with the B-Missing score as an explanatory variable and the C-Missing score as a response 
variable. The scores were found to be highly correlated (R2 = 0.85, F(1, 40) = 225.1,  p < .001). 
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Additionally, the line of best fit for the model indicates a nearly one-to-one relationship between 
average predictive scores on the B-Missing type and on the C-Missing type (β = 1.04, t(40) = 
15.00, p < .001). Based on this model, participants seem to perform similarly on the two different 
types of games.  
To test the statistical significance of the set and type variables, game set and game type 
were both entered as within-subjects variables in a repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean 
prediction score. The main effect of game set was found to be highly significant (F(2,82) = 
13.92, p < 0.001). However, the main effect of game type was not found to be significant 
(F(1,41) = 1.84, p = 0.18). These results confirm the exploratory analysis that participants’ 
predictive scores significantly differ among the three sets but not within the two game types. 
Indicated by the data, this difference in predictive scores is explained by increasingly predictive 
reasoning in each set. These findings are therefore consistent with the initial hypothesis of 
predictive reasoning becoming more common as participants gain experience with the task. 
Predictive Scores by Time 
Since both the linear model and ANOVA results indicate that predictive scores were 
similar in the two game types, these types were collapsed for the remaining analyses. Predictive 
scores were recalculated into six time points that divided each set into halves. From the fixed 
design, each half-set had two diagnostic games of the B-Missing type and two diagnostic games 
of the C-Missing type to calculate a similar predictive score ranging from 0 to 1 in increments of 
0.25. For the six time points, the proportion of respondents with each score, the average 
predictive scores, and their standard error are shown in Figure 6. The average predictive score at 
the first time point is 0.51, which indicates that on average, the starting strategy is neither clearly 
myopic nor clearly predictive. The plots show that the average predictive score substantially 
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increased between the first and second time points and gradually increased at all remaining time 
points. These results indicate that the early phase in which participants are first learning the task 
may be the most important time for establishing whether participants will learn to reason 
predictively. 
Discussion 
Participants were trained as Player I similarly to the Hedden and Zhang (2002) design. 
However, since participants did not have to make their own decisions in the games, it cannot 
necessarily be assumed that they took Player I’s perspective when analyzing Player II. 
Nonetheless, participants often described their strategies as transferring their Player I perspective 
from their training experience, using “I” pronouns to relate to the strategy of the hypothetical 
past Player I. However, some participants chose to shift to the perspective of Player II, 
describing analyzing Player II as comparable to “playing as Player II.” It was not possible to 
determine the exact prevalence of these perspectives, since not all participants gave a clear 
indication of the perspective with which they primarily identified. Predictive reasoning in either 
of these cases can be described as second-order reasoning, since participants in both cases were 
reasoning about a prior player anticipating an opponent. The perspective taking demands were 
therefore comparable to prior studies. 
Unlike Hedden and Zhang (2002), this study found a mixed strategy at the outset that 
tended towards predictive reasoning by the second time point. This is likely in part due to the 
task demands that specifically instructed participants to analyze a decision by a prior Player II, 
which may engage theory of mind reasoning more readily than anticipating a player in real time. 
Although Zhang et al. (2012) found that limits in perspective taking were not solely explained by 
working memory constraints, this task provided a situation where executive demands were 
THEORY OF MIND AND INFERENCES 	   18 
reduced. Participants’ only demands were to answer a question based on a prior player’s decision 
and did not need to decide any moves themselves. This may have freed cognitive resources to 
devote to higher order reasoning. 
Similarly to prior findings, the reasoning level showed a tendency to increase with 
additional experience. Based on both trends in scores and from participants’ descriptions, this 
often occurred because of a shift from myopic to predictive reasoning. Interestingly, the 
observed increase in reasoning level occurred even in the absence of feedback. Participants did 
not get any indication of the accuracy of their choices, unlike real-time players, who would 
receive lower point scores if they were incorrectly anticipating the opponent. The design 
contributed to this lack of feedback because decisions were chosen to be plausible for either 
reasoning strategy. Alternatively, there are certain scenarios where decisions would only be 
plausible for one of the strategies, regardless of which of the two missing values were 
substituted. These scenarios were not used because our goal was to explore which strategy was 
naturally assumed. Since participants did not receive evidence to influence strategy choice, it 
seems that experience with merely the task of analyzing another person’s decisions is sufficient 
to boost reasoning abilities.  
One divergence from prior studies is the presence of the experimenter as the opponent in 
the training session, as opposed to a confederate posing as a peer to the participant. Although this 
should not have affected participants’ ability to learn the games, it may have provided an early 
bias when participants were learning to anticipate Player II’s strategy. Participants may have 
more naturally expected the experimenter to anticipate their decisions at the third stage than they 
would for a peer opponent, since the presumed role of the experimenter is to analyze their 
performance. This expectation may have transferred to the “prior subjects” when the participants 
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began the task. Hedden and Zhang (2002) did not find an impact of perceived intelligence of the 
opponent on performance in their study, but the participants in that case did not have continual 
face-to-face contact with the opponent, as they did with the experimenter in this study. 
Therefore, this distinction may also explain the trend of earlier predictive reasoning than seen in 
some prior studies. This observation leads to the interesting question of whether baseline theory 
of mind reasoning levels vary between peers and “authority figures” that are assumed to have 
some degree of meta-knowledge about the task. Since many real-world strategic interactions are 
indeed with authority figures, this question could have practical implications. 
Limitations 
 Initially, we intended to implement this project with a computer opponent giving real-
time feedback. Since coding this design was beyond the current project’s resources, game cards 
listing “prior decisions” were used instead. As mentioned, this design limited task constraints so 
they were not directly comparable with prior studies. Another concern is a disproportionate 
number of female participants, which occurred by chance based on the introductory psychology 
students who chose to sign up for the study. This limits the generalizability of the study to both 
genders, although whether gender affects performance on this task is unclear. A final limitation 
is that the timing of the project allowed for a smaller sample size than desired. Possible future 
studies may attempt to replicate these findings with more subjects.  
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 The results of this study combined with prior studies provide an insightful picture of our 
theory of mind capacities in two-player games. We tend to view others as highly rational when 
directly asked to do so or when put in their position (Zhang et al., 2012). However, we seem to 
have a harder time attributing full rationality to others in real-time interactions, although this is 
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more readily done in direct competition (Goodie et al., 2012; Hedden & Zhang, 2002). 
Importantly, this study supported that predictive reasoning becomes more likely with experience, 
regardless of feedback on the task. This could potentially extend usefully to social interactions, 
because our ability to fully understand others’ motivations may simply increase with the practice 
of consciously questioning them. 
There are several possible future research questions stemming from this design that could 
supplement findings on this topic. One option is to use decisions that provide evidence about the 
player’s strategy in order to investigate how participants adapt to this evidence. Another option is 
to readapt this task to a real-time computer format similar to prior studies, to explore how 
inferences from real-time decisions differ from analyzing decisions from a more distant past. 
Strategic gaming paradigms have provided a useful framework for studying theory of mind, but 
the ecological validity has yet to be determined. It will be very interesting to see how studies that 
more fully capture the real-world environment relate to these findings. 	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Table 1 
List of training block games Player	  I	   Player	  II	   Player	  II	  Decision	   End	  Point	  1324	   1234	   Go	   D	  4321	   2413	   Stop	   A	  3412	   4321	   Stop	   B	  2431	   3142	   Go	   C	  3241	   3421	   Stop	   A	  3421	   2413	   Stop	   B	  1432	   4123	   Go	   C	  2134	   1243	   Go	   D	  3124	   4312	   Stop	   A	  1234	   4321	   Stop	   B	  2143	   1234	   Go	   C	  3214	   3142	   Go	   D	  
 
 
Note. This table lists each game’s payoff sets by cell (in the order of ABCD) for Player I and 
Player II, the consistent decision made by the experimenter, and the expected end point if both 
players decide optimally. 
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Table 2 
List of experimental games 
  
Note. This table lists each game’s payoff sets by cell (in the order of ABCD) for Player I and 
Player II (“?” indicates a covered value). The decisions in this table were provided on the game 
card. In diagnostic games, the myopic response is the opposite response from the predictive. In 
non-diagnostic games, the accurate response applies to both strategies. The same question was 
used within each pattern, focusing on the discriminatory missing value and the critical cell. 
	   B-­‐Missing	  Type	  Pattern	  1	  ?-­‐?-­‐	  1-­‐	  3	  	   Pattern	  2	  ?-­‐?-­‐	  4-­‐	  2	  	  Question:	  Could	  there	  be	  a	  2	  in	  cell	  B?	   Question:	  Could	  there	  be	  a	  3	  in	  cell	  B?	  Diagnostic	   ID	   Decision	   Predictive	  Response	   ID	   Decision	   Predictive	  Response	  1234	   10	   STOP	   No	   20	   GO	   No	  1324	   11	   STOP	   No	   21	   GO	   No	  1423	   12	   STOP	   No	   22	   GO	   No	  2314	   13	   STOP	   No	   23	   GO	   No	  2413	   14	   STOP	   No	   24	   GO	   No	  2134	   15	   STOP	   No	   25	   GO	   No	  Non-­‐Diagnostic	   	   Accurate	  Response	   	   	   Accurate	  Response	  1243	   16	   STOP	   Yes	   26	   GO	   Yes	  1342	   17	   STOP	   Yes	   27	   GO	   Yes	  2341	   18	   STOP	   Yes	   28	   GO	   Yes	  2431	   19	   STOP	   Yes	   29	   GO	   Yes	  1432	   50	   STOP	   Yes	   52	   GO	   Yes	  2134	   51	   STOP	   Yes	   53	   GO	   Yes	  	   C-­‐Missing	  Type	  Pattern	  3	  ?-­‐	  2-­‐	  ?-­‐	  4	  	   Pattern	  4	  ?-­‐	  3-­‐	  ?-­‐	  1	  	  Question:	  Could	  there	  be	  a	  1	  in	  cell	  C?	   Question:	  Could	  there	  be	  a	  4	  in	  cell	  C?	  Diagnostic	   ID	   	  Decision	   Predictive	  Response	   ID	   Decision	   Predictive	  Response	  1234	   30	   GO	   Yes	   40	   STOP	   Yes	  1324	   31	   GO	   Yes	   41	   STOP	   Yes	  1423	   32	   GO	   Yes	   42	   STOP	   Yes	  2314	   33	   GO	   Yes	   43	   STOP	   Yes	  2413	   34	   GO	   Yes	   44	   STOP	   Yes	  2134	   35	   GO	   Yes	   45	   STOP	   Yes	  Non-­‐Diagnostic	   	   Accurate	  Response	   	   	   Accurate	  Response	  1243	   36	   GO	   No	   46	   STOP	   No	  1342	   37	   GO	   No	   47	   STOP	   No	  2341	   38	   GO	   No	   48	   STOP	   No	  2431	   39	   GO	   No	   49	   STOP	   No	  1432	   54	   GO	   No	   56	   STOP	   No	  2134	   55	   GO	   No	   56	   STOP	   No	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Figure 1. Diagram of sample game with stages. The top values correspond to Player I’s payoff 
values and the bottom values correspond to Player II’s payoff values. The arrows indicate the 
potential decision at each of the game stages. 
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Figure 2. Accuracy distribution of all participants. Most participants had a total accuracy score 
above 65% correct, but there were a few outliers with scores lower than this percentage. The 
outliers have been removed from further analysis. 
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Figure 3. Predictive scores by set for the B-Missing type of game. The first chart shows the 
distribution of players at each possible score for the three sets. The second chart shows the 
average predictive score for each set, with bars indicating the standard error. The average 
predictive score increases in each successive set, primarily explained by the increasing 
proportions of respondents with a perfect “1” predictive score. 
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Figure 4. Predictive scores by set for the C-Missing type of game. The first chart shows the 
distribution of players at each possible score for the three sets. The second chart shows the 
average prediction score for each set, with bars indicating the standard error. The average 
predictive score increases in each successive set, although the increase in the third set is less 
notable than for the B-Missing type. The increase in the second set can be explained by a greater 
proportion of respondents with a perfect “1” predictive score and the smaller increase in the third 
set can be explained by a greater proportion of respondents with the second highest “0.75” score. 
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Figure 5. Plot of each individual’s overall average predictive scores on the B-Missing and C-
Missing types. The fitted model was C-Missing Type Average = 0.00 + 1.04 B-Missing Type 
Average, R2 = .85, p < .001. Individuals seem to perform similarly on each game type. 
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Figure 6. Predictive scores by time point. Each time point was half of a set and included two 
games from each type. The first chart shows the distribution of players at each possible score for 
each time point. The second chart shows the mean prediction score for each time point, with bars 
indicating the standard error. Although all time points show an increase in reasoning score, the 
most substantial increase seems to be between the first and second time point. Proportion of 
respondents with perfect “1” predictive scores shows a similar trend. 
